Spring Break
Iraq experts discuss 'de-baathification'
By: Wes Kimbell
Issue date: 4/24/08 Section: News
Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III and Gen. Peter Pace came to Texas A&M Friday for a panel discussion about the future of Iraq.
Before the panel discussion, which drew hundreds of Aggies, Bremer addressed a small group of students for a question and answer period.
Most students in the small group were familiar with Bremer's actions and choices as the first presidential envoy to Iraq, personally selected by the Bush administration, and they brought probing questions, something the former Ambassador may not have been expecting.
These questions included information about the dissolution of Iraq's army, which Lt. Gen. McKiernan's staff is reported to have said would put 300,000 trained fighters "on the streets," and begin "de-baathification," the decision to rid the government of an estimated 20,000-50,000 Baath party members.
These decisions were arguably the most important and most controversial in early Iraq. Bremer was in charge in Iraq during both of these decisions.
In January 2007, in a testimony before the Senate, Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the Armed Forces, said the dissolution of the Iraqi army and "de-baathification" were the two most "significant mistakes the U.S. has made to date in Iraq."
"I don't agree with Petraeus. It was a very mild policy and very narrowly drawn," Bremer said. "[De-baathification] was perfectly consistent with the desire to create a more open, liberal, Western-style government, and was by far the most popular thing we did in Iraq."
However, some experts argue the "de-baathification" and dissolution of Iraq's army left many Iraqis with nowhere to turn and caused soldiers to join anti-American militant groups, adding to the conflict with more than 4,000 U.S. servicemen and -women dead and more than 30,000 wounded.
"It is true [that de-baathification] was implemented in a way by the Iraqis which was much broader than what we intended. And that, I think, is what Petraeus was talking about," Bremer said. "I stand by the decisions."
There is controversy about "Order No. 1" or "de-baathification," as some top officials have said they were not aware of it before it was issued.
Colin Powell, the former U.S. secretary of state, and McKiernan, the top military leader in Baghdad at the time, have said they were not aware of the de-baathification orders.
Yet, Bremer said it was unanimous among the administration that de-baathificaion was the right thing to do.
"The state department was certainly in favor [of de-baathificaion]," he said. "The state department ran the study called 'The Future of Iraq,' in which the Iraqi exiles were asked what they think and they were unanimous - 'Get rid of the Baath party.'?"
Before the panel discussion, which drew hundreds of Aggies, Bremer addressed a small group of students for a question and answer period.
Most students in the small group were familiar with Bremer's actions and choices as the first presidential envoy to Iraq, personally selected by the Bush administration, and they brought probing questions, something the former Ambassador may not have been expecting.
These questions included information about the dissolution of Iraq's army, which Lt. Gen. McKiernan's staff is reported to have said would put 300,000 trained fighters "on the streets," and begin "de-baathification," the decision to rid the government of an estimated 20,000-50,000 Baath party members.
These decisions were arguably the most important and most controversial in early Iraq. Bremer was in charge in Iraq during both of these decisions.
In January 2007, in a testimony before the Senate, Gen. David Petraeus, commander of the Armed Forces, said the dissolution of the Iraqi army and "de-baathification" were the two most "significant mistakes the U.S. has made to date in Iraq."
"I don't agree with Petraeus. It was a very mild policy and very narrowly drawn," Bremer said. "[De-baathification] was perfectly consistent with the desire to create a more open, liberal, Western-style government, and was by far the most popular thing we did in Iraq."
However, some experts argue the "de-baathification" and dissolution of Iraq's army left many Iraqis with nowhere to turn and caused soldiers to join anti-American militant groups, adding to the conflict with more than 4,000 U.S. servicemen and -women dead and more than 30,000 wounded.
"It is true [that de-baathification] was implemented in a way by the Iraqis which was much broader than what we intended. And that, I think, is what Petraeus was talking about," Bremer said. "I stand by the decisions."
There is controversy about "Order No. 1" or "de-baathification," as some top officials have said they were not aware of it before it was issued.
Colin Powell, the former U.S. secretary of state, and McKiernan, the top military leader in Baghdad at the time, have said they were not aware of the de-baathification orders.
Yet, Bremer said it was unanimous among the administration that de-baathificaion was the right thing to do.
"The state department was certainly in favor [of de-baathificaion]," he said. "The state department ran the study called 'The Future of Iraq,' in which the Iraqi exiles were asked what they think and they were unanimous - 'Get rid of the Baath party.'?"
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